LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES

Purpose
This publication is the sixth part in a series of Recommendations regarding the modes of operation of block cipher algorithms. The purpose of this part is to provide approved methods for key wrapping, i.e., the protection of cryptographic keys.
Authority
This publication has been developed by the Conformance testing for implementations of this Recommendation will be conducted within the framework of the Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program (CAVP) and the Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP). The requirements of this Recommendation are indicated by the word "shall." Some of these requirements may be out-of-scope for CMVP or CAVP validation testing, and thus are the responsibility of entities using, implementing, installing, or configuring applications that incorporate this Recommendation.
Introduction
Overview
This Recommendation specifies a deterministic authenticated encryption mode of operation of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) algorithm. The mode is called AES Key Wrap, abbreviated as KW in this Recommendation. Although KW can be used with any reversible padding scheme, a variant of KW with a padding scheme is also specified to promote interoperability. This variant is called AES Key Wrap With Padding, abbreviated as KWP. The analogue of KW with the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) [5] as the underlying block cipher is also specified, to support legacy applications. This analogue is called Triple DEA Key Wrap, abbreviated as TKW.
NIST Special Publication 800-38F DRAFT KW, KWP, and TKW were designed to protect cryptographic keys. Each provides an option for protecting keys in a manner that is distinct from the methods that protect general data. Segregating keys from general data can provide an extra layer of protection.
Nevertheless, there is no requirement to protect cryptographic keys with a distinct cryptographic method. Previously-approved authenticated encryption modes-as well as combinations of an approved encryption mode with an approved authentication method-are approved for the protection of cryptographic keys, in addition to general data.
Similarly, KW, KWP, and TKW are each approved for the protection of general data, in addition to cryptographic keys.
KW, KWP, and TKW are each robust in the sense that each bit of output can be expected to depend in a nontrivial fashion on each bit of input, even when the length of the input data is greater than one block. This property is achieved at the cost of a considerably lower throughput rate, compared to other authenticated encryption modes, but the tradeoff may be appropriate for some key management applications. For example, a robust method may be desired when the length of the keys to be protected is greater than the block size of the underlying block cipher, or when the value of the protected data is very high.
Related Specifications
Earlier specifications of key wrap algorithms that are related to KW, KWP, and TKW are discussed in this section.
In 2001, NIST posted a document entitled "AES Key Wrap Specification" on NIST's Computer Security Resource Center web site as an unofficial suggestion for the protection of cryptographic keys. That algorithm is essentially equivalent to KW as specified in this Recommendation.
In 2002, two industry groups published key wrapping specifications that were based on the specification that NIST posted. First, the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) developed an essentially equivalent specification in Request For Comments (RFC) 3394 [9] . Second, the Telecommunications Industry Association published a protocol for Digital Radio Over-the-AirRekeying [1] containing a "Key Wrap Algorithm" that supported TDEA, in addition to the AES algorithm. Those algorithms are essentially equivalent to KW and TKW as specified in this Recommendation.
In 2008, Accredited Standards Committee X9, Inc., published a key wrap standard for the financial services industry [2] . The variant of KW in that standard, named AESKW, featured a more general framework for formatting the input data, including a padding scheme, as well as an analogue with TDEA as the underlying block cipher.
In 2009, a different padding scheme was specified in RFC 5649 [4] , referencing elements of the specification in [9] . The resulting algorithm, called AES Key Wrap With Padding, is essentially equivalent to KWP as specified in this Recommendation. DRAFT
The differences between KW, KWP, and TKW as specified in this Recommendation and their earlier specifications are described in Appendix B.
Definitions and Notation
Definitions
approved FIPS-approved or NIST-recommended: an algorithm or technique that is either 1) specified in a FIPS or a NIST Recommendation, or 2) adopted in a FIPS or a NIST Recommendation.
authenticated encryption function
A function that encrypts plaintext into ciphertext and provides a means for the associated authenticated decryption function to verify the authenticity of either the plaintext or the ciphertext.
authenticated decryption function
A function that decrypts purported ciphertext into corresponding plaintext and verifies the authenticity of the data. The output is either the plaintext or an indication that the plaintext is not authentic.
authenticity The property that data actually originated from its purported source.
bit A binary digit: 0 or 1.
bit string A finite, ordered sequence of bits.
block For a given block cipher, a bit string whose length is the block size of the block cipher.
block cipher A permutation, determined from a specified family by the choice of a parameter called the key, on bit strings of a fixed length. The permutation is called the forward cipher function, and its inverse is called the inverse cipher function.
block cipher mode of operation (mode)
A function, or a pair of related functions, e.g., for encryption, authentication, or authenticated encryption, of which a block cipher is the main component.
block size For a given block cipher and key, the fixed length of the input (or output) bit strings. plaintext Usable data that is formatted as input to a mode. prerequisite A required input to an algorithm that has been established prior to the invocation of the algorithm.
semiblock Given a block cipher, a bit string whose length is half of the block size.
sequence of n semiblocks For a given block size and a positive integer, n, a string that can be represented as the concatenation of n semiblocks.
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Variables
C
The ciphertext.
ICV1
The 64-bit default ICV for KW: 0xA6A6A6A6A6A6A6A6.
ICV2
The 32-bit default ICV for KWP: 0xA65959A6.
ICV3
The 32-bit default ICV for TKW: 0xA6A6A6A6.
P
The plaintext.
Operations and Functions
s
The bit string that consists of s consecutive '0' bits.
CIPHK (X)
The output of the forward cipher function of the block cipher under the key K applied to the block X.
The output of the inverse cipher function of the block cipher under the key K applied to the block X.
int(X)
The integer for which the bit string X is the binary representation.
len(X)
The bit length of the bit string X.
LSBs (X)
The bit string consisting of the s right-most bits of the bit string X.
MSBs (X)
The bit string consisting of the s left-most bits of the bit string X.
TW(S)
The output of the wrapping function for TKW applied to the string S.
The output of the unwrapping function for TKW applied to the string C.
W(S)
The output of the wrapping function for KW and KWP applied to the bit string S.
The output of the unwrapping function for KW and KWP applied to the bit string C.
NIST Special Publication 800-38F DRAFT x
The least integer that is not less than the real number x.
[x]s The binary representation of the non-negative integer x as a string of s bits, where x<2 s .
X  Y
The bitwise exclusive-OR of bit strings X and Y whose bit lengths are equal.
X || Y The concatenation of bit strings X and Y.
0x
The marker for the beginning of a hexadecimal representation of a bit string.
Examples of Basic Operations and Functions on Strings
In this publication, the new courier font indicates the '0' bit, the '1' bit, and any hexadecimal symbols: 0, 1, …, 9, A, B, C, D, E, F.
The beginning of a hexadecimal representation of a string is marked by '0x.' For example, 0xA659=1010011001011001.
Given a real number x, the ceiling function, denoted x, is the least integer that is not less than x. For example, 2.1= 3, and 4= 4. 
00000000.
The concatenation operation on bit strings is denoted ||. For example, 001 || 10111 = 00110111.
Given bit strings of equal length, the exclusive-OR (XOR) operation, denoted , specifies the addition, modulo 2, of the bits in each bit position. For example, 10011  10101 = 00110.
Given a bit string X, the bit length of X is denoted len(X). For example, len(00010)=5.
Given a bit string X and a non-negative integer s such that len(X)≥s, the functions LSB s (X) and MSB s (X) return the s least significant (right-most) bits and the s most significant (left-most) bits, respectively, of X. For example, LSB3(111011010)=010, and MSB4(111011010)=1110.
Given a positive integer s and a non-negative integer x that is less than 2 Given a (non-empty) bit string X, the string-to-integer function, denoted int(X), is the integer x such that [x] len(X) =X. In other words, int(X) is the non-negative integer less than 2 len(X) whose binary representation is X. For example, int(00011010) = 26.
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Common Elements
The common elements of KW, KWP, and TKW are introduced in the following three sections, including the associated notation and requirements. The underlying block cipher and key are discussed in Sec. 5.1. The authenticated encryption and authenticated decryption functions and their core transformations, the wrapping and unwrapping functions, are discussed in Sec. 5.2. Limits on the length of the data to be protected are discussed in Sec. 5.3.
The Underlying Block Cipher and Key
The transformations of the variants of KW feature a block cipher as the main component; thus, each variant is a mode of operation (mode, for short) of the block cipher. The mode key is exactly the key for the underlying block cipher. This key is called the key encryption key (KEK), denoted K.
For any given KEK, the underlying block cipher of the mode is a permutation, i.e., an invertible function, on bit strings of a fixed length. The strings are called blocks, and the length of a block is called the block size. The permutation is also called the forward cipher function, denoted CIPH K , to distinguish it from its inverse, called the inverse cipher function, denoted CIPH -1 K .
For KW and KWP, the underlying block cipher shall be approved, including the length of the KEK, and the block size shall be 128 bits. Currently, the AES algorithm is the only block cipher that fits this profile. For TKW, the underlying block cipher is specified to be TDEA, and the length of the KEK may be any key size for which TDEA is approved; see [6] . The choice of the key size affects the security of the algorithms against brute force search, but the key size will not be explicitly indicated in the specifications. Methods for generating cryptographic keys are discussed in [7] ; the goal is to select the keys uniformly at random, i.e., for each possible key to occur with equal probability.
The KEK shall be secret, i.e., disclosed only to parties that are authorized to know the protected information. Compliance with this requirement is the responsibility of the entities using, implementing, installing, or configuring applications that incorporate this Recommendation. The management of KEKs is outside the scope of this publication.
The Authenticated Encryption and Authenticated Decryption Functions
For a given KEK and block cipher, KW, KWP, and TKW are each comprised of two related functions: authenticated encryption and authenticated decryption. The authenticated encryption function takes an input string, called the plaintext, denoted P, and returns a longer output string, called the ciphertext, denoted C. The authenticated encryption function expands the data so that only a small fraction of strings of any given length are ciphertexts.
The authenticated decryption function takes an input string, called the purported ciphertext, and returns either 1) an output string or 2) a special symbol, denoted FAIL. In the first case, the NIST Special Publication 800-38F DRAFT output string is the unique plaintext that corresponds to the purported ciphertext, which confirms that it is a genuine ciphertext.
For KW, the authenticated encryption function and the authenticated decryption function are denoted KW-AE and KW-AD; for KWP, the functions are denoted KWP-AE and KWP-AD; for TKW, the functions are denoted TKW-AE and TKW-AD.
Note that, although the KEK is a parameter for each of these six functions, in the specifications of these functions in this Recommendation, the KEK is considered to be a prerequisite, i.e., an input that has been established prior to the invocation of the function, and is omitted from the notation. Similarly, the choice of the block cipher for the KW and the KWP functions is a prerequisite that is omitted from the notation. Within the authenticated encryption function, the wrapping function is applied to an enlarged plaintext string to produce the ciphertext. Each key wrap variant enlarges the plaintext by prepending a fixed string called the integrity check value (ICV); for KWP-AE, the enlarged plaintext also includes a 32-bit encoding of the octet length of the plaintext and possibly some "zero" octets as padding.
In each key wrap variant, the authenticated decryption function applies the unwrapping function to the purported ciphertext and then verifies whether the output string is the result of properly enlarging a plaintext string.
A useful unit of length for describing these functions is half the block size, i.e., 64 bits for KW and KWP, and 32 bits for TKW. A string of this length is called a semiblock, and, for a positive integer n, a string that can be represented as the concatenation of n semiblocks is called a sequence of n semiblocks.
For each key wrap variant, the wrapping function and the unwrapping function are defined on sequences of three or more semiblocks. The length of the output is the same as the length of the input.
KW-AE (or TKW-AE) is defined on any sequence of two or more semiblocks. For KWP-AE, the domain of possible inputs is extended to nonempty octet strings; the 32-bit encoding of the octet length of the plaintext within KWP-AE, however, imposes a mild restriction, namely, KWP-AE is only defined when the octet length of the plaintext is less than 2 32 .
The authenticated decryption function for each key wrap variant is defined on any sequence of three or more semiblocks.
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Limits on Data Length
Mandatory limits on plaintext lengths for each key wrap variant, and the corresponding limits on ciphertext lengths, are described in Sec. 5.3.1. Additional, implementation-specific limits on the data lengths are discussed in Sec. 5.3.2.
Mandatory Limits
KWP is only defined when the length of the plaintext is less than 2 32 octets, i.e., when the plaintext is a sequence of fewer than 2 29 semiblocks. KW can accept longer inputs; nevertheless, the plaintext for KW-AE shall be limited to a sequence of fewer than 2 54 semiblocks. The plaintext for TKW-AE shall be limited to a sequence of fewer than 2 28 semiblocks. Similarly, the ciphertext for KW-AD shall be limited to a sequence of no more than 2 54 semiblocks, and the ciphertext for TKW-AD shall be limited to a sequence of no more than 2 28 semiblocks. The motivation for these restrictions is discussed in Appendix A4. This information, along with the minimum lengths from Sec. 5.2, is summarized in Table 1 : Compliance with these requirements is the responsibility of the entities using, implementing, installing, or configuring applications that incorporate this Recommendation.
Implementation-Specific Limits
A plaintext length, or the corresponding ciphertext length, that is allowed for an implementation of a key wrap algorithm is called a valid length.
The set of valid plaintext lengths for the authenticated encryption function may be restricted to any subset of the lengths described in Table 1 . Any restricted set of plaintext lengths corresponds to a restricted set of ciphertext lengths. In particular, for KW and TKW, the ciphertext is one semiblock longer than the plaintext; for KWP, the ciphertext is one semiblock longer than the padded plaintext.
The definition of the set of valid plaintext lengths is a prerequisite for the authenticated encryption function. The corresponding set of valid ciphertext lengths shall be a prerequisite for the authenticated decryption function. Note that these sets, like the other prerequisites for these functions, must be agreed upon in order for two communicating implementations to interoperate properly.
There is a requirement in [6] that, in order to keep a Restricted status for TKW with 2-key TDEA as the underlying block cipher, the number of invocations of TK-AE shall not exceed 2 20 for a given KEK; the Restricted status is described in that publication. There is no requirement to limit NIST Special Publication 800-38F DRAFT the number of invocations for KW-AE or KWP-AE. Considerations for limiting the number of invocations of the authenticated decryption function are discussed in Appendix A3.
Specifications of KW and KWP
W and W -1
Algorithm 1 below specifies the wrapping function, W, for KW-AE (see Sec. 6.2) and KWP-AE (see Sec. 6.3), with a given block cipher and KEK.
Algorithm 1: W(S)
Prerequisites: approved block cipher, CIPH, with a 128-bit block size; key, K, for CIPH.
Input: a sequence of n semiblocks S, for n≥3.
Steps: 1. Initialize variables. a) Let S 1 , S 2 , … , S n be the semiblocks such that Figure 1 below illustrates the wrapping function applied to a sequence of four semiblocks, i.e., W(S 1 || S 2 || S 3 || S 4 ) = C 1 || C 2 || C 3 || C 4 . Each "wire" carries a semiblock, and each of the eighteen numbered rectangles represents an invocation of the underlying block cipher with the KEK. On the left side of these rectangles, the input block's most significant 64 bits enter the top wire, while on the right side of these rectangles, the output block's most significant 64 bits exit the bottom wire; this convention makes for fewer wire crossings.
NIST Special Publication 800-38F DRAFT , of an approved block cipher with a 128-bit block size; key, K, for CIPH.
Input: a sequence of n semiblocks, C, for n≥3. 
KW
Algorithm 3 below specifies the authenticated encryption function for KW for a given block cipher and KEK. The wrapping function, W, specified in Algorithm 1 above, is invoked in Step 3 with the same block cipher and KEK as prerequisites. Algorithm 7 below specifies the wrapping function, TW, for the authenticated encryption function of TKW (see Sec. 7.2) with a given KEK, K. In this algorithm, CIPH K denotes the forward cipher function of TDEA with K as the key.
Algorithm 7: TW(S)
Prerequisites: key, K, for TDEA.
Input:
sequence of n semiblocks S, for n≥3.
Steps:
1. Initialize the variables. a) Let S 1 , S 2 , … , S n be the semiblocks such that 
TKW
Algorithm 9 below specifies the authenticated encryption function for TKW for a given TDEA key. The wrapping function, TW, specified in Algorithm 7 above, is invoked in Step 3 with the same key.
Algorithm 9: TKW-AE(P)
Prerequisites: KEK, K; definition of the set of valid plaintext lengths.
Input:
plaintext P, with valid length.
Output: ciphertext C.
Steps:
1. Let ICV3=0xA6A6A6A6. 2. Let S =ICV3 || P.
Return C=TW(S).
Algorithm 10 below specifies the authenticated decryption function for TKW for a given TDEA key. The unwrapping function, TW NIST Special Publication 800-38F DRAFT Given repeated attempts, of course, the adversary can increase the probability that a randomlygenerated string will eventually be accepted as a valid ciphertext. The system or protocol that implements the authenticated decryption function should monitor and, if necessary, limit the number of unsuccessful verification attempts for each key.
A4
Forgeries of Extremely Long Messages
The motivation for the limits on the length of the plaintext in Sec. for each index j such that 5m<j<i6, or 4m<j<i5, etc; collisions will also occur at these indices for the R values that are defined in Algorithm 2. For i1, these colliding R values are part of the output of the unwrapping function, as described in Equation 1 with d = i1.
The first semiblock of the output of the unwrapping function determines whether a purported ciphertext will pass the integrity check within the authenticated decryption function. Therefore, if S||T is a given ciphertext for KW, then the modified ciphertext S||U will also pass the integrity check provided that the collision conditions are satisfied. In other words, if six suitable collisions occur, S||U will be a successful forgery. Moreover, the first i1-1 semiblocks of the resulting plaintext will be identical to the plaintext from which S||T was generated.
For KWP, S||U would also be a successful forgery if the collision conditions are satisfied and if no padding octets were appended to the plaintext during the generation of S||T.
For TKW, an analogue of the above analysis applies, adapted to the smaller semiblock size.
